|Edited by Francesco Coniglione, Roberto Poli and Jan Wolenski
Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993
The paper considers the influence of Franz Brentano on K. Twardowski and on the Lvov- Warsaw School, in general. The modifications proposed by Twardowski to Brentano’s theory of the act-object distinction are analyzed. It is claimed that the wealth of the School’s analyses and the philosophical impact of its logical tools can only be explained in terms of the ontological basis provided by Brentano’s descriptive psychology.
The relation of the work of Husserl and Twardowski is analyzed, centering on Husserl’s discussion of Twardowski’s book Inhalt und Gegenstand. It emerges that whereas Twardowski introduced a new kind of objects, the intentional ones, Husserl developed the distinction between presentations-with-an-object and presentations-without-object.
The paper describes the influence exerted by the phenomenology of Husserl and Ingarden on Polish scientific philosophy. It shows that phenomenology played a role in contrasting the neopositivistic influence and confirmed the Poles’ adversion to the dogmatic side of neopositivism.
The paper concerns the polemic between Marxism and Polish scientific philosophy in the early 50’s — the only case where Marxism was challenged by a strong methodological tradition. The most important scholars involved in the debate were A. Schaff, L. Kolakowski, B. Baczko (on the Marxist side) and K. Ajdukiewicz and T. Kotarbinski (on the side of scientific philosophy).
The problem of classification of reasoning was a topic of specific and detailed interest for Polish methodologists and philosophers. The paper presents and discusses theories of reasoning of Twardowski, Lukasiewicz, Salamucha, Ajdukiewicz, and Czezowski.
The representatives of the Polish scientific school devoted most of their attention to the moral obligations involved in research work: “freedom of science” and “serving the objective truth” were norms written on their banners.
Twardowski’s descriptive semiotics is an abstract theory of linguistic phenomena, i.e. a system of definitions and their consequences, a system built with the method of logical analysis preceded by an inventory and supplemented with a classification of these phenomena. This theory consists of the psycho-physical conception of signs, the functional conception of expression, and the noematic conception of sense.
Several prominent Polish philosophers were nominalists. This paper concentrates mainly on the theories of Lesniewski and Kotarbinski, in the belief that their views are the most interesting, historically the most important, and the most useful for a clear presentation of the difficulties that nominalism has to face.
The aim of the paper is to present the main methodological features of the school of psychology which stemmed from the Lvov-Warsaw school. These characteristics are (a) the analytical method, (b) a specifically understood introspective procedure, (c) the method of interpreting its products and (d) the importance of the role of intuition in psychological cognition. Also of relevance are the objection against the so-called “statisticsmania” and “textsmania.”
This paper considers the meta-philosophical views of Lukasiewicz and his efforts to solve the problem of determinism. The author’s analysis of Lukasiewicz’s famous paper ‘On determinism’ shows that it is possible to construct formal systems which are useful for such purposes.
The paper discuss the influence of French conventionalists, Poincaré and Le Roy, on Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism. Ajdukiewicz contradicted their intuitions claiming that all cognitions need a conceptual apparatus.
The paper presents Ajdukiewicz’s post-WWII criticism of conventionalism. Ajdukiewicz charges conventionalism with ascribing to science procedures and methods which are, in fact, alien to it..
Although Tarski’s main background was in mathematics, he was dedicated to a very serious study of philosophy under T. Kotarbinski and participated actively in the philosophical life of his time. The paper concentrates on Tarski’s explicit philosophical views concerning the philosophy of language, the problem of truth (including some problems in the philosophy of logic and mathematics), philosophy of science and Tarski’s general views on science and society.
Kotarbinski’s reism claims that there are only things. The criticisms of Ajdukiewicz forced Kotarbinski to transform his theory from “an ontological doctrine with a semantic flavor” to “a semantic doctrine with an ontological flavor.” The paper discusses this “dramatic stage” in the development of reism and compares it with the reism developed by Brentano.